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Abstract
Whether it is online commerce, international relations, or simply through email communication, the encryption and decryption of data is essential to the inner workings
of everyday life. To encrypt and decrypt efficiently, it is important that there is some
structure behind the process rather than just a random procedure. The purpose of
this research is to analyze different encryption schemes and their structure, with a
focus on schemes that apply algebraic coding theory to cryptography. Cryptosystems
based in algebraic coding theory are particularly important to the future of cryptography, as they are resistant to attacks by quantum computers, unlike many currently
employed cryptosystems.

Specifically, we examine the McEliece cryptosystem and its variations, in particular
the use of Reed-Solomon codes. The goal is to understand the algebraic structure
underlying the McEliece cryptosystem as well as to understand its shortcomings and
variations that may strengthen it. The current results show that the original Goppa
codes that are used in the McEliece systems are stronger and more secure than the
proposed Reed-Solomon code alternative.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The encryption of data is essential to a number of applications including online commerce, international relations, and simply through email communication. To encrypt
and decrypt efficiently, it is important that there is some structure rather than just
a random process. This structure not only crucial to the security of the system, but
also ensures that the cryptosystem can be widely deployed.

In this work, we explore a variety of mathematical structures underlying different
encryption/decryption schemes. To begin, the basic cryptography framework will be
described, including the analysis of the differences between private-key and public-key
cryptosystems, as well as notable examples of each. While private-key cryptography
is symmetric in the encryption and decryption process, public-key is asymmetric to
ensure that knowledge of encryption does not reveal knowledge about decryption.
This asymmetry creates interesting requirements for the encryption and decryption
processes. The continued importance of cryptography and development of alternative
cryptosystems will be discussed particularly in the context of the advent of quantum
computers.
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Next, we present an introduction to algebraic coding theory. Algebraic coding theory
investigates how to encode and decode messages so that if noise corrupts part of the
message during transmission, it will still be understood by the receiver. We will explore a variety of mechanisms for introducing redundancy and designing codes that are
both efficient and effective at error correction. Reed-Solomon codes will particularly
be focused on. These codes are constructed by evaluations of polynomials at the elements of certain finite fields, and they rely on polynomial interpolation for decoding.

After, we turn to an application of coding theory to cryptography in the McEliece
cryptosystem, and analyze the encryption and decryption processes of this. Additionally, we examine variations on the McEliece cryptosystem, namely the Niederreiter
variation, and use of alternative codes such as Reed-Solomon codes. It is proposed
that Reed-Solomon codes can be implemented within the McEliece cryptosystem in
order to reduce key size. Lastly, a vulnerability of the variant of the McEliece cryptosystem is analyzed. This vulnerability was exposed through a specific attack exploiting the structure of Reed-Solomon codes with the McEliece cryptosystem. This
is ultimately problematic as it excludes the straightforward use of Reed-Solomon
codes within the McEliece cryptosystem. This motivates the need for future research
involving the security of the McEliece cryptosystem with other alternative codes or
better disguise of the Reed-Solomon codes moving forward.

Chapter 2
Cryptography Background
Cryptography is the study of encrypting and decrypting messages, with the goal of
sending a message so that only the people intended to read it will be able to, without
any unwanted eyes. Cryptography is used in practically every aspect of modern day
data transmission: e.g., driving down toll roads, secure Internet transactions, and
even sending emails. There are many goals that cryptographers have when creating
a cryptosystem, with some of the most important being: (1) making the encryption
process computationally easy and inexpensive; (2) making the decryption easy for
those who have the key and computationally intractable for those who don’t; (3)
minimizing the space that the encryption and decryption algorithms take so that
they can be implemented on a variety of devices (laptops, tablets, phones, etc.) [1].
Irrespective of the cryptosystem, the process of encryption/decryption is the same:
given a plaintext message, somehow scramble it to a ciphertext, which is then transmitted to the intended receiver who can unscramble the ciphertext to recover the
original plaintext. In this process, keys are needed to implement both encryption and
decryption. In private-key cryptography the keys are the same for both encrypting
and decrypting data, and thus must be kept completely private. This is problematic
for encryption on a large scale since every arbitrary user would need a different key

6
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and there would need to be mechanisms in place for privately communicating a new
key for every user. This is the motivation for public-key cryptography. In public-key,
any user will be able to encrypt, all using the same key. The encryption key is made
public, and the cryptosystems is designed so that this public key doesn’t give information about the private key, which is used to decrypt by the receiver.

This section describes and analyzes both of these systems as well as notable examples
of each.

2.1

Private-Key Cryptography

Private-key cryptography makes use of only one key, which is used to both encrypt
and decrypt messages. Thus, logically, the key must be kept private because anyone
possessing the key can recover the message.

One of the first examples of private-key cryptography was the Caesar Cipher [2].
The cipher first utilizes an alpha-numeric conversion (A=0, B=1, C=2 ...). Then the
encryption follows the equation

y ≡x+3

mod 26

while decryption is precisely the inverse functions

x≡y−3

mod 26.

Example 2.1.1. Suppose you want to encrypt the plaintext message “MATH IS
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COOL”. First the alpha-numeric conversion is applied:

12 0 19 7 8 18 2 14 14 11

This is followed by the encryption algorithm for the Caeser Cipher:

15 3 22 10 11 21 5 17 17 14

Finally, the alpha-numeric conversion is applied again with the message broken up
into a strings of length 5:
PDWKL VFRRO
which are then transmitted. The inverse of this algorithm is used to decrypt the
message. Starting with our ciphertext, we reapply the alpha-numeric conversion:

15 3 22 10 11 21 5 17 17 14

This is followed by the decryption algorithm:

12 0 19 7 8 18 2 14 14 11.

Applying the alpha-numeric conversion for the final time yields our original message
MATHISCOOL
Notice that knowledge of the encryption key (size of the numerical shift) immediately
reveals how to decrypt any ciphertext message. Hence the need to keep the key private. The Caesar Cipher specifically uses a shift of size 3, however any shifts ranging
from 1 − 25 would also be appropriate for the shift cipher.
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The most prominent example of private-key cryptography is Data Encryption Standard (DES). DES was created in the 1970s by members of the National Security
Agency and the National Institute of Standards and Technology [1]. DES relies on
block ciphers in which 64-bit blocks are encoded using a 56-bit key.

A block cipher is a type of algorithm that operates on string containing a fixed number of bits. Specifically, DES uses layers of block ciphers that separate the right and
left hand sides of the plaintext to further scramble and encrypt the data [1]. An
inverse function is used to decrypt the ciphertext message.

The full details of DES are beyond the scope of this work, in particular because
private-key cryptography is no longer widely used. However, DES is still employed
for some private communication within private companies. Due to the fact that
private-key cryptography only has one key, it is not only impractical to use privatekey cryptography for large-scale encryption but it also jeopardizes the security of
the cryptosystem. This is a major shortcoming of private-key cryptography. Thus,
public-key cryptography is typically used for large-scale encryption and decryption.

2.2

Public-Key Cryptography

Public-key cryptography is similar to private-key in that a function is used to encrypt
data and an appropriate inverse function is used to decrypt. However, in public-key
cryptography the function and key used for encryption do not reveal the inverse function required for decryption, which relies on a separate key. This means that the
while the decryption key is still kept private, the encryption key can be made public.
This also makes encryption more accessible; more people are able to use a public key.
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At first glance, this may seem to indicate that public-key cryptosystems are weaker
or more vulnerable than private-key ones. But fortunately, this is not the case as the
decryption key is still extremely difficult to discover without the right information.

One simple, yet extremely powerful example of public-key cryptography is the RivestShamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem. RSA is one of the most common cryptosystems and is typically used to secure information online, particularly in e-commerce
transactions [2]. This cryptosystem relies on a fundamental result from abstract algebra and number theory.

2.3

RSA cryptosystem

RSA is one of the most widely used cryptosystems today [2]. It is a public-key cryptosystem and its security relies on the computational intractability of factoring large
numbers. The RSA cryptosystem’s public keys include n = pq as well as the encoding exponent E. Kept private are the primes p and q (chosen to be large, typically
300-digits long) and the decoding exponent D. The security of RSA lies in the Euler
ϕ-function, which counts how many natural numbers less than n are relatively prime
to n.

Since n = pq then receiver knows that ϕ(n) = ϕ(pq) = ϕ(p)ϕ(q) = (p − 1)(q − 1).
The choice of E and D is informed by the value of ϕ(n). Specifically, we exploit the
following result:
Theorem 2.3.1. If a, n, are relatively prime then aϕ(n) ≡ 1 mod n [3]
From this we choose E such that gcd(E, ϕ(n)) = 1 and D such that ED ≡ 1
mod ϕ(n). Note that D = E −1 mod ϕ(n). For a plaintext message x and asso-
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Figure 2.1: Flowchart describing the RSA cryptosystem
ciated ciphertext y, the encryption function is given by

y ≡ xE mod n

From this the derivation of the decryption function is quite simple:

y ≡ xE mod n
y D mod n ≡ (xE )D mod n
y D mod n ≡ (xED ) mod n
≡ x1 mod n

Since it’s necessary to know ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) in order to discover D, which is
necessary to the decryption process. Without the knowledge of p and q, the prime
factorization of n must be known, hence the computational intractability because no
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polynomial time algorithm exists.

Example 2.3.1. Suppose that Alice wants to send Bob an encrypted message. Bob
posts his public key n = 713, E = 13. Suppose that Alice wants to send the message
420. They can now compute

y ≡ 42013 mod 713
≡ 4208 · 4204 · 420 mod 713
≡ 18 · 100 · 420 mod 713
≡ 220

and Alice sends Bob 220. Since Bob knows the factorization of n, he can compute

ϕ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1).

From this he uses the Extended Euclidean Algorithm to find D such that ED +
ϕ(n)k = 1 for some k ∈ Z which guarantees that ED ≡ 1 mod ϕ(n). Specifically, he
can then compute

x ≡ 220457 mod 713
≡ 420

The value of D is the private key that Bob will use to decrypt. Thus, he knows that

x ≡ 360457 mod 660

and he can recover the original message 420.

2.4. QUANTUM COMPUTING & VULNERABILITIES OF RSA
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Quantum Computing & Vulnerabilities of RSA

The security of RSA relies on the inability of a user to factor the public key n, in
order to find ϕ(n) and D. Generally, this factoring is computationally intractable
making the RSA cryptosystem resistant to attacks to crack it in a timely manner.
However, that could all change with the widespread availability of quantum computers. Quantum computers take advantage of superposition and multiple states in
order to greatly reduce processing time. Specifically, on a standard computer all the
existing algorithm for factoring large numbers require non-deterministic polynomial
(N P ) time. However, on a quantum computer, due to the structure of representation,
a polynomial time algorithm exists [4].While these computers currently exists in their
earliest forms, they are expensive and impractical for everyday use [5].

One of the current goals in cryptography is to search for other N P -complete problems, whose structure can be exploited to create alternative public-key cryptosystems
and cannot be solved efficiently in polynomial time regardless of the computational
power or representation [4]. In other words, cryptographers want a problem that
cannot be solved by any computer in polynomial time. Specifically, cryptographers
seek an N P - complete problem that does not have a polynomial algorithm on a quantum computer. One such problem that has been proposed is the decoding of random
linear codewords from an unknown code, which has shown to be N P -complete [4].
Such a problem can be the key computational bottleneck that provides security to
a cryptosystem. This motivates the use of algebraic coding theory to develop new
cryptosystems. To better understand these cryptosystems, we begin with background
on algebraic coding theory.

Chapter 3
Coding Theory
The goal of coding theory is to ensure successful communication of a message even
when noise may be present that corrupts parts of the message during transmission.
To achieve this, structured redundancy is added onto the message to ensure that
errors in transmission can be detected and corrected. One of the simplest encoding
schemes is a repetition code, where the message is repeated n times. Through this
redundancy, the receiver will be able to compare the messages and find errors. However, there are much more efficient ways to send messages that require significantly
fewer redundant bits while still ensuring that the message will be understood by the
receiver (see Figure 3.1)

Figure 3.1: Flowchart for the standard coding theory paradigm
The basic structure of encoding is as follows. Uncoded messages (usually binary k14
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tuples) are first encoded into codewords (binary n-tuples). The codeword is then
transmitted. If the received word contains no errors, it is assumed that there were
not enough errors to transform one codeword to another and so it is assumed that no
errors occurred and the received word is decoded as itself. However, if errors occur
due to noise in the transmission, then the received word will differ in at least one bit
from all the codewords. The goal of coding theory is to construct the codes so that
the decoding scheme will be able to detect, and then correct a guaranteed number of
errors within the received word.

As stated previously, one of the simplest coding schemes is to encode the message by
simply repeating it multiple times. This way, the received message can be compared
to itself in order to find errors. However, this process is not only time consuming,
but also requires a large codeword to be sent for a relatively small message. Thus
repetition codes are not ideal, but the idea of building in redundancy in the code is
still an important one.

Another coding scheme is to implement a parity check. This checks the number of 1’s
in the bit string. One bit is appended to the message and will be set to either 0 or 1 to
make the total number of 1’s even. Depending on the parity of the received message,
the receiver will know if there is an error in the message based on the number of 1’s,
i.e. if the parity is odd, then you know that the message contains an error. While a
parity check bit is certainly more efficient than just a repeated message, it is still not
completely trustworthy for detecting errors, let alone correcting them. For example, a
parity check would be useless if more than 1 error had occurred. If two different errors
occurred in transmission then the parity would be even again, rendering the check
useless. Additionally, a parity check doesn’t indicate where the error occurred, just
that there is one. Thus, a single parity check does not provide enough redundancy
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for an effective code.

3.1

Block and Linear Codes

Block codes are a stronger mathematical tool that will not only allow for codes that
detect multiple errors, but also codes that can actually correct errors as well. A block
code is one where blocks of k binary digits are encoded to n binary digits [3]. In
other words, an (n, k)-block code consists of both an encoding function that encodes
k digits to n digits, and a decoding function that goes back again:

E : Zk2 → Zn2

D : Zn2 → Zk2

E must be a one-to-one function as two different blocks will not be encoded to the
same element. Elements in the image of E, C = E(Zk2 ), are called codewords [3].

The Hamming distance between two n-tuples is defined to be the number of bits
in which the two n-tuples differ. For example, the 4-tuples 0100 and 0001 have a
Hamming distance of 2. The minimum distance of a code, is the minimum of all
the distances between distinct codewords. The Hamming distance is important as
it gives a measurement of the possible error detection and correction capabilities a
code. The larger the Hamming distance, the more errors that a code will be able to
detect and correct. However, if the Hamming distance is too large, then there are
fewer n-tuples available as possible codewords and fewer messages can be transmitted.
Ideally, codewords are chosen from a sphere-packing arrangement. Figure 3.2 gives a
cartoon representation of such a sphere-packing arrangement; in actuality, the possible
codewords are points in the Boolean lattice Fn2 , and spheres with respect to Hamming
distance are centered around such points. Here we see a two dimensional cartoon of
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this sphere packing to understand the error-correcting capabilities of a given code
(see cartoon in Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: Choosing codewords from a sphere-packing arrangement is guaranteed a
specified minimum distance and error-correcting capabilities
To see how Hamming distance determines error-detecting/correcting capability, observe that if the minimum distance between codewords is d then it would take d
errors to turn one codeword into another. The receiver knows errors have occurred
whenever the received words is not a codeword and thus, d − 1 errors can be detected.
However,

d−1
2

errors can be corrected, since the errors need to be corrected to the

correct codeword. As shown in Figure 3.2, disjoint spheres of radius
codewords. If more than

d−1
2

d
2

surround the

error occur, then it would be impossible to tell the

correct codeword in which the message should be decoded into or that a message will
be decoding to a wrong codeword.

Theorem 3.1.1. If a code has a minimum distance of 2m + 1, then the code can
correct m or fewer errors and detect 2m errors [2].
Proof. Suppose that a code has minimum distance of 2m + 1. Consider a codeword
x that is transmitted and let z be the received word, with at most m errors. Thus,

3.1. BLOCK AND LINEAR CODES
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d(x, z) ≤ m. Let y be another codeword such that x ̸= y. By the triangle inequality:

d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z) + d(y, z)

This means that:

m + 1 = 2m + 1 − m ≤ d(x, y) − d(x, z) ≤ d(y, z)

This shows that since d(y, z) ≥ m + 1, z will be decoded as the correct codeword x
instead of another codeword, y. Additionally, for any received word ẑ with d(x, ẑ) ≤
2m, y, we see that ẑ cannot be a codeword and 2m errors will be detected.
A particularly important type of block codes are linear code which are subsets of
Zn2 that have group structure. Specifically, C ⊆ Zn2 is linear if 0 ∈ C and for every
c1 , c2 ∈ C, we have c1 + c2 ∈ C, where addition is defined as adding the entries
together, respectively. Linear codes have an important property that the minimum
distance between any two code words is the same as the minimum weight of all nonzero
codewords [3]. Weight is the amount of 1’s in a given code. This follows because

d(c1 , c2 ) = d(c1 − c2 , 0) = minwt(c1 , c2 ).

Note that c1 − c2 = c1 + c2 ∈ C.

Linear codes have the additional property that they are the null space of an k × n
matrix over Z2 . In other words, a linear code is the set of all x ∈ Zn2 that satisfy
HxT = 0 where H ∈ Mk×n (Z2 ). We call H a parity-check matrix of the corresponding linear code. Each row of H prescribes a parity check a codeword, i.e. a subset of
entries that must have an even number of 1’s.
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Given the structure of linear codes, there must a efficient way to generate all of the
codewords in the code. This is not efficiently done with the parity-check matrix.
Instead, we turn to a generator matrix, G, of the code. Aptly named, G, generates
all the codewords for a given code. Specifically, the rows of the generator matrix are
basis vectors for a linear subspace C. Generator matrices and parity-check matrices
are closely related. A generator matrix is called systematic if it has the form

G = [Ik |A]

for some A ∈ M (Z2 ) (the set of all matrices with entries in Z2 ) [3]. In this case, the
encoded message is visible in the first k bits of the codeword.The parity check matrix
for the code generated by G then has the form



H = AT |In−k

so that HGT = [0].

3.2

Reed-Solomon Codes

There are other codes that utilize algebraic structure. Polynomial codes are one such
example. These codes still employ generator and parity-check matrices, however they
capitalize on the fact that messages and/or codewords can be represented as polynomials, not just as vectors. Specifically, an m−tuple gives rise to a polynomial of
degree m − 1 by prescribing the coefficients of the polynomial. For example, the
5-tuple 11001 is represented by the polynomial 1 + x + 0x2 + 0x3 + x4 or 1 + x + x4 .

At the fundamental level, Reed-Solomon codes are derived from evaluating poly-
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nomials at specific points. Consider a finite field K, of degree m over Zp that is
generated by powers of α, the root of an irreducible polynomial in Zp [x]. That is to
say K = Zp (α). Then, K contains pn elements and if the minimum polynomial is in
fact primitive, then α is a primitive element of K, meaning K ∗ = ⟨x⟩.

Now consider a polynomial P (x) = a0 + a1 x1 + . . . ak−1 xk−1 where each of the
ai ∈ K and k < pm . In other words, the coefficients of the polynomial are in
K. We consider a Reed-Solomon code to be the mapping from the code generated
by G k−tuple of the coefficients of P (x) to the evaluation of P (x) at the powers
of α. That is to say: (a0 , a1 , . . . ak−1 ) maps to (P (0), P (α), P (α2 ) . . . P (1)), where
P (x) = a0 + a1 x1 + . . . ak−1 xk−1 . The k−tuple is encoded into a pm −tuple which is
then transmitted. Given a finite field F, for each k < n there is a Reed-Solomon code
of dimension k and length n = pm that is defined by evaluation of polynomials of
degree of at most k − 1 at n points of the field F [6].

In order to decode, we must recover the original polynomial P (x). Since P (x) has
degree k − 1, it can be characterized by k points. This means that a system of k
equations need to be solved out of the n = pm possible choices of equations:

P (0) = a0
P (α) = a0 + a1 α + a2 α2 + · · · + ak−1 αk−1
P (α2 ) = a0 + a1 α2 + a2 α4 + · · · + ak−1 α2k−2
...
P (1) = a0 + a1 + a2 + · · · + ak−1

The existence of all these additional equations provides redundancy so that errors in
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transmission can be corrected. Observe that there are
 m
p
k
choices of equations to solve and each give a prediction for P (x).

An equivalent representation of Reed-Solomon codes is as a linear codes generated by
a matrix of the form:

1 1 1


0 α1 α12


0 α α2
2

2

..
 ..
.
.

0 αk αk2

...
...
...

...


1


1


1


.. 
.

1

Matrices of this form are known as Vandermonde matrices which have special
proprieties such that each k columns are linearly independent [2]. Specifically, ReedSolomon codes have the property that the Vandermonde determinant is nonzero [6].
This further ensures that any k equations will be linearly independent.

In the unlikely case that the transmitted message has no errors, we could have comm
puted our original message, (a0 , a1 , . . . ak−1 ),in pk different ways. However, any
errors that occur within the transmitted pm −tuple will inevitably affect the values
of the ai ’s when decoding. This is why it will be useful to have the redundancy of
multiple systems of equations to solve.

If no errors have occurred, then any choice of k equations gives the correct value of
P X(x). With errors in transmission, different choices of equations may have different
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predictions for P (x) and thus it is necessary to perform multiple computations to
determine the correct transmitted polynomial. We will see that that for s errors, the
wrong k−tuple (the wrong prediction of a polynomial) can be calculated


s+k−1
k
ways. This will be useful in determining the number of errors a code can correct.
Lemma 1. Given s errors in transmission, there are

s+k−1
k



sets of equations that

give incorrect predictions of P (x) [6].
Proof. Each equation of the form P (αi ) defines a hyper plane in K k . Thus any choice
of k equations yields of intersection of k hyperplanes, which corresponds to a k−tuple.
By the linear independence of the equations P (αi ), it follows that these hyperplanes
will meet at exactly one point [6]. This k−tuple is a prediction for the polynomial
P (x).

Since we have established linear independence from above, it is the case that these
hyper planes will meet at only one point. For every choice of k equations that gives
the correct polynomial and thus the correct k−tuple, all the hyperplanes must intersect at that same point.

For a wrong k−tuple, there are at most s + k − 1 hyperplanes intersecting at a single
wrong point, where s is the number of wrong equations coming from errors in the
codeword, and k−1 equations are chosen from the remaining pm −s correct equations.
Note: if there were more than k − 1 correct equations, the correct solution would be
determined from their point of intersection. Thus, there can be at most



s+k−1
k
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choices of equations from which an incorrect k−tuple would be determined.
From the proof above, we see that any choice of k equations from the pm − s correct

m
equations yields the correct k− tuple. Thus, there are p k−s ways to calculate a
correct k−tuple, and whenever

pm − s > s + m − 1,

there will be more correct determinations than incorrect ones. Thus for correct decoding, we must have
s<

pm − k
.
2

In other words, Reed-Solomon codes can correct up to

pm −k
2

errors.

This computation for error-correcting ability matches the fact that s ≤

d−1
2

since the

minimum distance, d, of Reed-Solomon codes is pm − k + 1. Since each polynomial
will have k − 1 roots, the minimum distance between any two Reed-Solomon codes
is exactly pm − k + 1. Since Reed-Solomon codes are linear codes, we know that the
minimum distance between any two codewords is equal to the minimum weight of all
the codewords. Note that the weight of a codeword is the number of nonzero entries.
Also note that relatively small degree polynomials have few roots. Specifically, the
number of roots in a degree k − 1 polynomial is at most k − 1. This means that there
are at most k −1 zeros and thus makes the minimum weight pm −(k −1) or pm −k +1.

The following is an example of a Reed-Solomon code of dimension k = 3 and length
16 over the field K = Z2 (α) with 16 elements.
Example 3.2.1. Consider K = Z2 (α) where α is a root of the polynomial x4 +x+1 =
0. Since this polynomial doesn’t have any linear or quadratic factors, it is irreducible.
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With this, we know K is a degree 4 extension over Z2 so n = 4 and |K| = 16.
Moreover, the root α is in fact primitive, so that K ∗ = ⟨α⟩.
Let k = 3 so each information vector has the form (a0 , a1 , a2 ) ∈ K 3 . Every such
vector gives rise to the polynomial P (x) = a0 + a1 x + a2 x2 . Then the encoding map
is given by
(a0 , a1 , a2 ) → (P (0), P (α), P (α2 ), . . . , P (α15 ))
Since there are 163 information vectors, the Reed-Solomon code contains 163 codewords. The minimum distance between codewords is:

pm − k + 1 = 16 − 3 + 1 = 14

This code can correct any pattern of 6 error or less since

s<

pm − k + 1
2

Chapter 4
The McEliece Cryptosystem
In this section, we analyze the original form the the McEliece cryptosystem first proposed in 1978 by R.J McEliece. This public-key cryptosystem exploits structure from
algebraic coding theory, specifically introducing intentional errors in the encryption
stage in order to ensure security. Specifically, the security of this cryptosystem relies
on the fact recovering a random linear codeword from an unknown code is proven to
be an N P - complete problem [4].

The McEliece system was originally built using Goppa codes. These codes are similar
to Reed-Solomon codes as they are formed by evaluating functions at specific points.
Specifically, Goppa codes are formed by evaluations of functions from the function
field of an algebraic curve at points on that curve. These are a special class of algebraic geometry codes, which generalize Reed-Solomon codes. Note that Goppa codes
have length n = 2m and dimension k ≥ n − sm where s is the maximum number of
errors that the code can correct [7].

The first step in the construction of the McEliece cryptosystem is choosing a Goppa
code of length n = 2m , with dimension k < n and error-correcting capability s such
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that k ≥ n − sm. This Goppa code is specified by a particular k × n generator matrix
G.

Consider a k × n matrix G. For encryption, this matrix is scrambled using two
matrices S and P . This scrambling effectively disguises G. S is a non-singular k × k
matrix (the determinant of this matrix is nonzero) and P , is a permutation matrix
of size n × n. Note that S is non-singular; for the decryption algorithm to work, S
needs to be invertible. A permutation matrix is a matrix that only has entries 0 and
1, with exactly one 1 in any given row and column. The purpose of P is to permute
the entries of a given vector. The matrix P is chosen at random from among all
permutation matrices. P is also invertible. G, S, and P must be kept private as they
are the decryption key, while the public key is the generator matrix G′ given by:

G′ = SGP

together with the error correcting capability s. Note that the rows of G are permuted

Figure 4.1: Flowchart detailing the McEliece cryptosystem
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by P and the columns are scrambled by S. Thus, G is adequately scrambled to keep
its identity hidden even when G′ is known.

The encryption algorithm begins with a message to be transmitted that is broken up
into k-bit blocks. Let x be such a block. The encryption of x is as follows.

y = xG′ + z

for some randomly generated vector z ∈ Zn2 , with length n and weight s; z represents
intentional errors begin added. Note that xG′ gives a disguised codeword from the
Goppa code that has been permuted and y is a noisy version of this vector which is
then transmitted.

Once y is received, x can be recovered using the decryption algorithm. The first step
is to compute y′ = yP −1 . Observe that y′ is a corrupted version of a codeword in
the Goppa code, since:

y′ = (xG′ + z)P −1
= (xG′ )P −1 + zP −1
= xSG + zP −1
= (xS)G + z′

Note that z′ is just a permutation of z since the inverse of a permutation matrix is
also a permutation matrix and thus z′ also has weight s. Therefore, y′ is a corrupted
codeword of the Goppa code, containing at most t errors. Since the code is known
by the receiver, any decoding algorithm for the code, e.g. Patterson’s algorithm can
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be used to recover xS [7]. Then, since S is invertible and is part of the private key,
x can be immediately recovered and the original message is obtained.

There are two potential source of attack on the McEliece cryptosystem. The first is
to attempt to of recover S, P , and G from G′ . The second is the brute force approach
of constructing the original vector x from the transmitted vector y.

It has been shown that both attacks are computationally intractable, ensuring the
security of the cryptosystem. Specifically, by choosing n and s large enough, the first
attack can be circumvented since there are too many possibilities for the matrices S
and P to recover G by brute-force. Furthermore, since P is randomly generated, this
increases the security and ensures that G′ cannot be deconstructed. Since the rows of
G are permuted by P and the columns are scrambled by S, G is adequately disguised.

The second attack, deconstructing y into the original message x, is harder to account for. However, security against it is also enhanced by the size of n and s. This
is because in order to effectively decode an intercepted vector y, it will need to be
compared to every codeword from a particular code, and the code is unknown to
the eavesdropper. Since decoding a random codeword from an unknown linear code
is NP-complete problem, a brute-force attack on the McEliece cryptosystem by attempting to decode y is computationally infeasible [7].

How do the two public-key cryptosystems, RSA and McEliece compare? It is clear
that the foundation for these cryptosystems is different. RSA relies on number theory
to form the foundation of its encryption and decryption schemes; using sufficiently
large prime numbers as well as Euler’s Theorem and the Extended Euclidean algorithm in order to encrypt and decrypt. In contrast, the McEliece cryptosystem pulls
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from algebraic coding theory by using a specific linear code and its generator matrix
in order to encrypt and decrypt. Despite these foundational differences, both systems are secure against both strategic attacks and brute-forces ones (as long as the
decryption keys are kept secure).

But, there are two key computational differences between RSA and the McEliece
cryptosystem that influence their ease in use: number of computations and key size.
The McEliece cryptosystem has the advantage when it comes to computational speed
because it doesn’t require a lengthy encryption and decryption process. The computation needed to encrypt and decrypt is relatively short when compared to RSA.
However, RSA has a smaller key size than McEliece; RSA requires that just a two
numbers be published for a public key, with only one other number kept as the private
key. On the other hand, the matrix G′ for the McEliece cryptosystem is relatively
large, due to the Goppa codes employed in the cryptosystem. This large key size is
the primary reason that the McEliece cryptosystem is not more widely used despite
it enhanced security against quantum attacks.

In order to overcome the large key-size of McEliece, it is important to explore other linear codes can be used in the implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Towards
this end, a number of researchers have been exploring variations on the McEliece
cryptosystem including the following variation.

4.1

Niederreiter Variation

One such variation of the McEliece cryptosystem is the Niederreiter variation. The
key difference between the McEliece cryptosystem and the Niederreiter variation is

4.1. NIEDERREITER VARIATION

30

the use of a parity-check matrix rather than a generator matrix that is used in the
original cryptosystem. Note that a parity-check matrix is a matrix H such that for
every codeword c ∈ C, H satisfies

HcT = 0.

One appeal of using the parity-check matrix over a generator matrix is the decoding
capabilities. Rather than using an algorithm to solve a system of equations, syndrome
decoding is used to decode from the parity-check matrix, which only requires a simple
precomputed look-up table. In this setting, a plaintext message x is viewed as an
error vector obtained from transmitting 0 and HxT is the syndrome of x with respect
to C. Then x can be recovered via syndrome decoding [8].

The encryption algorithm of the Niederreiter variation is similar to the McEliece
cryptosystem, except that the plaintext message will serve as added noise rather than
a random vector. To create the public key, two matrices, M and P are multiplied by
H:
H ′ = M HP,
where M is a non-singular (n − k) × (n − k) matrix and P is a permutation matrix.
Note that both M and P are invertible. Similar to the McEliece cryptosystem, H ′ is
the public-key, while the individual matrices, M , H, and P are kept as the private-key.

A given plaintext message x, will be encoded as

H ′ xT .

Note that the Niederreiter variation does not add intentional errors as part of the
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encryption algorithm. This is, once again, due to the use of H as part of the structure
of the Niederreiter variation. In this context, x is already considered an error-vector
with respect to transmission of the zero vector, 0. Once the ciphertext is transmitted,
the decryption algorithm is as follows:

M −1 (H ′ xT ) = M −1 M HP yT
= H(xP T )T

Since P xT = (xP T )T . Additionally since P is just a permutation matrix, (xP T )T still
has the same weight as x. Thus, we can use syndrome decoding on H((xP T )T ),to
obtain xP T . Finally, multiplying by (P T )−1 allows one to recover the original plaintext message x.

The same attacks on the McEliece cryptosystem can be applied to the Niederreiter
variation; namely attempting to deconstruct H ′ to the parts M , H, and P . These
attacks are circumvented in similar ways, similarly to the McEliece cryptosystem. By
choosing, q, n, and k sufficiently large enough, there are simply too many possibilities
to brute-force recover M , H, and P in a reasonable amount of time. Additionally,
the N P -problem of decoding a random linear codeword takes N P time, which still
provides the needed security.

The Niederreiter variation enables more efficient decryption, but it still does not solve
the issue of large key size. Thus, there are still a desire to use alternative code that
can be represented more compactly, such as Reed-Solomon codes [8]. Reed-Solomon
codes are still desirable to utilize within the Niederreiter variation due to the fact that
they meet the singleton bound, meaning they have an optimal trade-off between their
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rate and minimum distance, and thus between their efficiency and error-correcting
capabilities [2]. However, in the next section, the use of Reed-Solomon codes in
both the original McEliece cryptosystem and the Niederreiter variation have been
susceptible to attacks.

4.2

Attacks on the McEliece cryptosystem and Variations with Reed-Solomon codes

Sidelnikov and Shestakov propose an attack on the McEliece cryptosystem when
Reed-Solomon codes are used [9]. This attack is focused on reconstructing the individual matrices from the public-key; specifically the parity-check matrix will be
recovered by solving multiple systems of equations. The attack was developed for
the Niederreiter variation, however similar methods are used in order to attack and
deconstruct the original McEliece as well [9].

Consider a finite field Fq and let F = Fq ∪ ∞. Solving for the matrices, M , H, and
P is equivalent to solving

B = HU (x1 , x2 , x3 , . . . , xn ; z1 , z2 , z3 , . . . zn )

where the matrix B is known and the matrix U has the form
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for xi ∈ Fq and zi ∈ Fq \ 0. Since the matrix B is known, there are two main steps to
solve for the individual matrices, the first being solving for the xi ’s [9]. This algorithm
requires solving multiple systems of equations in order to derive the xi ’s from cj ∈ Fq .

Once those values are found, now we can find the zi ’s. For z1 = 1 solve the equality
s+2
X

= 1cj zj xij = 0

j

for 0 ≤ i ≤ s, such that cj ∈ Fq (not necessarily the ones used to solve the xi ’s) and
xij are the found xi ’s from the algorithm in [9]. In order to find the matrix H, one
can solve
s
X

hik xkj = zj−1 bij .

k=0

This algorithm provides a method for recovering the parity-check matrix H, which
means that the eavesdropper will be able to decrypt messages [9]. The original motivation for using Reed-Solomon codes was that they have sufficient structure such that
it is possible to represent them more compactly and thus obtain a smaller key size.
But as the attack demonstrates, this added structure can be exploited by the eavesdropper in order to recover the parity-check matrix H of the private key and crack
the encryption. Thus, Reed-Solomon codes cannot be used within the Niederreiter
variation and by extension the original McEliece cryptosystem (at least not directly)
because they will introduce serious security risks.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
The mathematical structure underlying different encryption/decryption schemes is
vitally important to understand as cryptography is essential to a number of modern
day applications, e.g. online commerce and email communication. Public-key cryptography is particularly of interest because it enables wide-scale use for encryption.
Compared to private-key cryptography, public-key employs an asymmetric algorithm
to the encryption and decryption process so that the knowledge of the public-key
does not give information away about the private-key.

The RSA cryptosystem is a widely used public-key cryptosystem. It’s security is
based in the computational intractability of factoring large numbers. However, the
RSA cryptosystem will soon become obsolete with the wide-scale usage of quantum
computers. Thus, a proposed alternative is the McEliece cryptosystem. As we have
seen, this cryptosystem relies on an NP-complete problem from algebraic coding theory; specifically, the intractability of decoding random linear codes. The original proposal employs Goppa codes, which have been shown to be highly secure, but require
a large public key making them impractical for everyday use. Thus, Reed-Solomon
have been proposed as an alternative because their structure allows for a smaller pub-
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lic key, while still maintaining high error-correcting capabilities. Reed-Solomon codes
are constructed by evaluations of polynomials at the elements of certain finite fields,
and they rely on polynomial interpolation for decoding. These codes can correct up
to

d−1
2

errors, where the minimum distance d = n − k + 1 and the code length n is

the size of some extension field.

Unfortunately, a specific attack exploiting the structure of Reed-Solomon codes with
the McEliece cryptosystem has shown the security risks of switching to these codes
[9]. This is ultimately problematic as it excludes the straightforward use of ReedSolomon codes within the McEliece cryptosystem. This motivates the need for future
research involving the security of the McEliece cryptosystem with other alternative
codes or better disguise of the Reed-Solomon codes moving forward.
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